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Bad routes update

Joe Abley <[email protected]> writes:
> I raised some issues regarding resilience of individual TCP sessions
> in the event of a pTLA-NLA event upstream, and the answers were (and are):
>  o  stability of individual sessions is not important in the event of
>     a routing change upstream;

I have a bridge to sell you in lower Manhattan, too.

>  o  having _new_ sessions connect correctly (i.e. handling the change
>     of TCP session endpoint address) is more important; this will be done by
>  o  an algorithm for choosing suitable source and destination addresses
>     for TCP virtual circuit endpoints that will become clear with
>     operational experience.
> I am not convinced by the first point, and the second and third ideas
> look very clumsy to me.

I agree. They're basically wishing, not technology.

Right now, we have v4 users who are doing just fine with redundant
links which *don't* lose their connectivity, and right now, we *don't* 
have these magic algorithms in any state that will work right.

I think those v4 users are not going to accept being told that they
can't do what they're doing now.

Like it or not, we will have to accept multiple announcements of
"punched-through" address blocks way below the /28 level.

I understand the desire to reduce the number of routes out there --
really, I do! -- and the strategy will work fine for many users. It
just isn't going to fly, though, with folks who are out there paying
for multiple carriers now so that they get reliability.