[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)

• To: [email protected]
• Subject: [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)
• From: [email protected] (Georgi Guninski)
• Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2016 11:26:55 +0200
• In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
• References: <CAMm+LwjTM7jWg5wg_A-iCRm5MM=Fg99Y1G6wEQeBmmE+1DEQVw@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]> <CAD2Ti29smV1BLHxzwR3D6W_WMTRZsxK7UrR8P1M3t8jmzTG-hw@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]>

Isn't it much more important "Can NSA break RSA efficiently" or
even "Can they efficiently factor integers"?

AFAICT these are not known to be theoretically equivalent.

There were low exponent attack ($3$) IIRC.

Don't remember seeing X509 RSA cert with exponent other than
2^16+1 (or something like this) and this is not much bigger...

• References:
  • Fwd: [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)
    • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
  • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)
    • From: [email protected] (juan)

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