[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Attacks on BGP Routing Ranges
Unfortunately, with my current situation, we have stopped exporting our prefixes with the tier-1 carrier and still use the outbound bandwidth. I highly doubt they will implement such a solution, but is something to keep in mind for the future.
Thanks for the tip!
From: Job Snijders <job at instituut.net>
Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2018 3:44 AM
To: Ryan Hamel
Cc: nanog at nanog.org
Subject: Re: Attacks on BGP Routing Ranges
On Wed, 18 Apr 2018 at 11:39, Ryan Hamel <Ryan.Hamel at quadranet.com<mailto:Ryan.Hamel at quadranet.com>> wrote:
I wanted to poll everyones thoughts on how to deal with attacks directly on BGP peering ranges (/30's, /127's).
I know that sending an RTBH for our side of the upstream routing range does not resolve the issue, and it would actually make things worse by blackholing all inbound traffic on the carrier I send the null to. What are my options for carriers that are not willing to help investigate the situation or write up a firewall rule to mitigate it on the circuit? I am not a fan of naming and shaming because it has unintended consequences.
Thanks in advance for everyone's suggestions.
Some carriers offer "unreachable linknets", linknets that are carved from netblocks that aren't announced in the DFZ or are firewalled off.
If the carrier doesn't want to help, your best course of action may be to disconnect the circuit to stop the attack traffic.