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Tier1 blackholing policy?

Le 01/05/2013 14:46, David Miller a ?crit :
> On 05/01/2013 05:40 AM, Thomas Schmid wrote:
>> Joel,
>> Am 30.04.2013 18:00, schrieb joel jaeggli:
>>> On 4/30/13 8:23 AM, Thomas Schmid wrote:
>>>> On 30.04.2013 17:07, Chris Boyd wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, 2013-04-30 at 10:59 -0400, ML wrote:
>>>>>> 1) Do nothing - They're supposed deliver any and all bits
>>>>>> (Disregarding
>>>>>> a DoS or similiar situation which impedes said network)
>>>>>> 2) Prefix filter - Don't be a party (at least in one direction) to
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> bad actors traffic.
>>>>> 3 - Deliver all packets unless I've signed up for an enhanced security
>>>>> offering?
>>>> right - I see this really as something that should be decided at the
>>>> edge
>>>> of the internet (Tier2+) and not in the core.
>>> You seem to have odd ideas about what it means to be a settlement
>>> free provider. Most of their customers are not smaller internet
>>> service providers.
>> I know what it means to be a customer of
>> $LargeGlobalISPthatsellsTransittootherISPs since
>> 1995 and I have *never* seen one of these guys blackholing
>> single IPs on their own (and I'm not talking about RTB, botnet
>> controllers that threaten to kill
>> the internet etc.). Now since a few weeks we get regular complaints
>> about this. So something has changed.
>> The sensitive approach would really be to make this an opt-in service
>> for their customers
>> and not a default service without opt-out option. In times of CGN and
>> hundrets or thousands of
>> websites behind one IP, blocking addresses is not the right answer to
>> the phishing problem.
> ... or perhaps on an internet where many network owners block / police /
> throttle packets by source or destination, implementing CGN or stacking
> thousands of websites behind one IP address are poor solutions to the
> connectivity problem.
> My only issue is the lack of information provided when blocks go into
> place.  I would love to see networks provide information publicly that
> shows what is being blocked along with a description of why.  A history
> that extends for a few days would be a bonus.

I agree with that. While some blocking and policing may be judged
"good thing" there is a well-known potential for "other kinds" of


> -DMM