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[c-nsp] DNS amplification
Yes, BCP38 is the solution.
Now, how widely is deployed?
Someone said in the IEPG session during the IETF86 that 80% of the
service providers had done it?
This raises two questions for me. One, is it really 80%, how to measure it?
Second, if it were 80%, how come the 20% makes so much trouble and how
to encourage it to deploy BCP38?
(well, actually 4 questions :)
On 3/16/13 7:24 PM, Jon Lewis wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Mar 2013, Robert Joosten wrote:
>>>> Can anyone provide insight into how to defeat DNS amplification
>>> Restrict resolvers to your customer networks.
>> And deploy RPF
> uRPF / BCP38 is really the only solution. Even if we did close all the
> open recursion DNS servers (which is a good idea), the attackers would
> just shift to another protocol/service that provides amplification of
> traffic and can be aimed via spoofed source address packets. Going
> after DNS is playing whack-a-mole. DNS is the hip one right now. It's
> not the only one available.