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Global Blackhole Service
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Steven M. Bellovin schrieb:
> On Fri, 13 Feb 2009 16:41:41 +0000 (WET)
> Nuno Vieira - nfsi telecom <nuno.vieira at nfsi.pt> wrote:
>> Ok, however, what i am talking about is a competelly diferent thing,
>> and i think that my thoughts are alligned with Jens.
>> We want to have a Sink-BGP-BL, based on Destination.
>> Imagine, i as an ISP, host a particular server that is getting nn
>> Gbps of DDoS attack. I null route it, and start advertising a /32 to
>> my upstream providers with a community attached, for them to null
>> route it at their network. However, the attacks continue going, on
>> and on, often flooding internet exchange connections and so.
>> A solution like this, widelly used, would prevent packets to leave
>> their home network, mitigating with effective any kind of DDoS (or
>> packet flooding).
>> Obviously, we need a few people to build this (A Website, an
>> organization), where when a new ISP connects is added to the system,
>> a prefix list should be implemented, preventing that ISP to announce
>> IP addresses that DON'T belong to him.
>> The Sink-BGP-BL sends a full feed of what it gots to Member ISP's,
>> and those member ISP's, should apply route-maps or whatever they
>> want, but, in the end they want to discard the traffic to those
>> prefixes (ex: Null0 or /dev/null).
>> This is a matter or getting enough people to kick this off, to build
>> a website, to establish one or two route-servers and to give use to.
>> Once again, i am interested on this, if others are aswell, let know.
>> This should be a community-driven project.
> In other words, a legitimate prefix hijacking service...
> As Randy and Valdis have pointed out, if this isn't done very carefully
> it's an open invitation to a new, very effective DoS technique. You
> can't do this without authoritative knowledge of exactly who owns any
> prefix; you also have to be able to authenticate the request to
> blackhole it. Those two points are *hard*.
As described in my earlier mail, I'd suggest to run a prefix-list generator
updating informations from IRR on a regulary basis and, as soon as a new
"matching" route-object appears in IRR, an automated mail might be send to the
ASN-owner (address also taken from irr-records) with a confirmation-link.
That way you'd need to hijack IRR-database and/or tech-c/admin-c mailbox
before being able to have a prefix added to the list of prefixes accepted from
> I also note that the
> scheme as described here is incompatible with more or less any possible
> secured BGP, since by definition it involves an AS that doesn't own a
> prefix advertising a route to it.
No, the router may work as Route-Reflector, so you see exactly the as-path as
is and the route-reflectors own asn isn't visible at all..
> --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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