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Re: [Captive-portals] Use Case: "Carrier Grade Captive Portal"

I *think* that this is quite similar to a captive portal system run by
Comcast -- I recently upgraded my cable-modem (my old one didn't
support v6). This means that I ended up with a new MAC address on the
CM, and Comcast placed me into a walled garden until I signed in (and
they associated my new MAC with my account) -- while a different cause
(new MAC vs malware), the rest is very similar.

So, I think that these would be well within scope.

On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Dave Dolson <[email protected]> wrote:
> I consider this in scope. It is an excellent example of why captive portals should be handled at the IP layer (layer3) with IP protocols, and are not only a WiFi (layer 2) problem.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Captive-portals [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Heiko Folkerts
> Sent: Wednesday, May 3, 2017 8:43 AM
> To: [email protected]
> Cc: Herzig, Willi; Gunther Nitzsche
> Subject: [Captive-portals] Use Case: "Carrier Grade Captive Portal"
> Hi everybody,
> I visited the capport WG the first time in Chicago. Thank you very much for the presentations! Afterwards I had a very brief chat with Martin about a use case, I name “carrier grade captive portals”. As a result I want to present this use case to you on this mailing list:
> *Background and use case:*
> In Germany the Federal Office for Information Security informs the ISPs with IPs, timestamp and other information of users that are part of a botnet. The ISPs are informing the users about the infection. We can not inform the users without the help of the ISP as they are the only ones knowing who is behind the dynamic IP address users get normally in Germany.
> There are different ways to inform users by the ISPs: e-mail, snail mail or a carrier grade captive portal (aka walled garden, forced portal),
> The most efficient way to inform and get systems cleaned has been proven is the carrier grade captive portal.
> One of the  internet service providers, NetCologne, uses a, as they call it, Forced Portal. The current solution is legal in germany, if the ISPs terms of service are appropriate.
> *Technically it roughly works like this:*
> - When the abuse management system detects that a user is infected, the CPE customers router connection (PPOE connection) is disconnected and immediately a new PPOE connection is started.
> - With the new PPOE connection, the CPE customers router gets a new DNSServer, IP, gateway (policy routing) and is connected to a carrier grade captive portal.
> - Within the new network connection all traffic is routed through a HTTP/HTTPS proxy. This proxy allows the user to access selected sites like informational sites about infections, AV and OS vendors and will otherwise present an information page to the user. This information page tells the user about the situation, including information about the infection(s) and instructs him how to clean the system.
> *Problem (almost the same as you know it):* As with captive portals in local networks this worked pretty well using HTTP.
> Also on Browsers, which first tries a HTTP connection, the information page  is displayed. Problem occurs now with HTTPS. Especially Google Chrome does no longer connect first using HTTP when the user enters a domain name of a web page if using HSTS and HSTS preload.
> Connecting with HTTPS, the browser detects a MITM attack (which of course makes sense, because it is MITM) and does not display the information page.
> Instead an error page is displayed, which generates a whole lot of calls to the costumer support. An addional problem we encounter is that the well known detection strategies used by iOS/macOS, Windows and Android for captive portals do *never* work in our case.
> Reason is that these detection strategies will only test for captive portals, when the network connection of the actual device (for example using WiFi) is started new. In our case the customers CPE router gets a new PPPOE connection, but the client  does not detect that the network connection to the internet was dropped by the router.
> Do you think that „carrier grade captive portals“ are in scope of the capport WG charta? Would the work already done at capport help to cope with this problem?
> My understanding of the current work in capport is, that it will not solve this problem entirely, but I think, it may already be half-way towards a solution. Because pushing a customer to a walled garden does not do a status change on the client system, but the CPE might work as some kind of “captive portal relais”, using at least parts of the current architecture of capport on the internal LAN.
> Do you think it is usful that the capport WG considers our use case in its work? Any help is appreciated.
> Best regards,
> Heiko.
> --
> Heiko Folkerts
> ---------------------------------------------------
> Referat CK 15
> Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
> Godesberger Allee 185 -189
> 53175 Bonn
> Germany
> Telefon:        +49 228 99 9582-5955
> Fax:            +49 228 99 10 9582-5955
> E-Mail: [email protected]
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>                 www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de
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I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
of pants.