Small codebase as a prerequisite for security

• To: Sean Lynch <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
• Subject: Small codebase as a prerequisite for security
• From: [email protected] (Peter Gutmann)
• Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2016 04:20:35 +0000
• In-reply-to: <CAHKdp-kj61bqPy9Eb5naXjWGRZGyZA_msGu0+LUg8adsNk4b7Q@mail.gmail.com>
• References: <CAHKdp-kUHHPwp10UobFuQgS4Vct=k7K5eqyY4685fS_ePMxesw@mail.gmail.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4BED0BF@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>, <CAHKdp-kj61bqPy9Eb5naXjWGRZGyZA_msGu0+LUg8adsNk4b7Q@mail.gmail.com>

Sean Lynch <[email protected]> writes:

>I'm not talking about raw size or complexity here; obviously having lots of
>features and support for lots of devices means high complexity, but it doesn't
>require that all that complexity run with full system privileges.

XKCD is, as usual, most apropos here:

https://www.xkcd.com/1200/

A huge amount of embedded stuff doesn't even have a kernel mode, because its
irrelevant (or, if the hardware does actually support two different modes,
everything is run in the highest-priv'd mode).  Either the system is
robust/secure/reliable or it isn't, whether there's a kernel/user split is
irrelevant.

Peter.

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• References:
  • Small codebase as a prerequisite for security
    • From: [email protected] (Sean Lynch)
  • Small codebase as a prerequisite for security
    • From: [email protected] (Peter Gutmann)
  • Small codebase as a prerequisite for security
    • From: [email protected] (Sean Lynch)

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