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Jim Bell's fiber-optic patent application.



I'd say one problem is cultural amongst the security cleared and ex-TLA
people with security people or current double agent security people on the
telco payroll.

Until they internalize that they are part of a dangerous to democracy and
civilization STASI 2.0 system, the problem will continue, because these kind
of gag order things are going to be handled by security cleared people only. 
In that way they can probably legally hide it from the CEO and the rest of
the company, by gagging the intercept request handling people.  And they can
surely require, if they do not already, that the intercept handling people
be security cleared.  And in that environment its got to be easy on
$250m/year black budget to stack the intercept handling departments in the
important (large) telco's with not just security cleared, but true-believer
ex-TLA types, or simply double agents.  They dont hve to pay the full salary
just an off the books loyalty bonus, as the telco is paying for its own
subversion.

So I think the main hope which is probably fairly slim, is that society
views shift to make even those ex-TLA people start to question whether they
are on the right side of history to the extent they have any ethics.


Another thought you've got to wonder if people dieing is a problem.  Whats
to stop an extremely conservative risk mentality security cleared person,
writing his memoirs spilling all in complete detail, parked with a lawyer
for release on death.  (Eg envelopes to be posted to NYT et al on his
eventual death).  Maybe that means old, and terminal people are going to
find it hard to be employed in security cleared roles. 

Adam

On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 04:28:44AM -0400, Travis Biehn wrote:
>   Doesn't the bureaucracy just react to these shenanigans rather than
>   quit? Cat + Mouse. They find other methods for coercion. They increase
>   accountability. Make leaks punishable to the CEO directly.
>
>   Better that it be made 'impossible' rather than part of policy. Since
>   policy is 'worthless'...
>
>   On Sep 20, 2013 8:53 PM, "Jim Bell" <[1][email protected]> wrote:
>
>   On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <[2][email protected]>
>   wrote:
>
>   On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell <[3][email protected]>
>   wrote:
>   >     To the list members of Cypherpunks:  I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim
>   Bell)
>
>     please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via
>     Dual_EC_DRBG,
>
>   > have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.
>
>     note that the "Cypherpunks list" at [4]al-qaeda.net is verboten,
>     having
>     sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber
>     base...
>     > ...  (Pardon me if I don't
>
>   > immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my
>   unfortunate
>   > 15-year absence.)
>
>     pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well,
>     if
>     you'd be so kind. ;)
>
>   >     Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the
>   US
>   > Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent
>   application.
>
>     your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber
>     that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically
>     viable...
>     good luck!
>
>   >>"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of
>   increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could
>   operate."
>   >Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)
>   Yes, I understand that a dramatic reduction in loss could accomplish
>   that.  But, as is obvious (particularly recently, with the Snowden
>   revelations) we have far more important, yet basic, vulnerabilities to
>   worry about just now, particularly since the major Internet and
>   telecommunications companies are now known to have been betraying us by
>   letting the NSA keep 'every' email, and telephone metadata, and adding
>   crypto back-doors into net encryption software.
>   I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call
>   "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every
>   government.  This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort
>   of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company
>   keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be
>   'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome;
>   Wikileaks) that would publicize it.  Primary methods as crude as
>   leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler,
>   or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer
>   leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations.
>   Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their
>   existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very
>   quickly leaked.  Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and
>   the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder
>   to prove.  Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease.
>        Jim Bell
>
>References
>
>   1. mailto:[email protected]
>   2. mailto:[email protected]
>   3. mailto:[email protected]
>   4. http://al-qaeda.net/